DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, WORLD SYSTEM POSITION

AND POLITICAL REPRESSION: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

by

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B.A., St. Cloud State University, 1985

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A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

College of Arts and Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Manhattan, Kansas

1987

Approved by:

James D. Miley

Major Professor

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Acknowledgments

I would like to take this opportunity and especially thank James Miley and Scott Frey who have contributed so much to my intellectual development and for their invaluable words of support and encouragment. I am also grateful to Jan Flora, Leon Rappaport, Eugene Friedman, Dennis Roncek, Harold Orbach, Richard Erede, Tin-Yu Ting, Henry Camp, George Peters, James Divney, Donald Adamchak, Marvin Kaiser and my fellow colleagues for making my experience at Kansas State University extremely rewarding.

A word of thanks is also due to Karen and Tammy Henderson and Beth Herrmann who have always been very helpful and accomodating with my constant interruptions.

My family has been very understanding and supportive of my goals and I would like to extend my appreciation and gratitude to the Kukrejas and the Khanijows at 6287 Smith. Thanks folks!

Finally, a special thanks to my friend and former colleague, Alan Abramowitz for his encouragement and confidence in me.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem of Political Repression

Concern with the functions and processes of the polity has long been an area of study (e.g., Levine and Cornwell, 1972; Orum, 1978). This is understandable given the far-reaching consequences of government in society. However, there is one topic that has received little serious consideration: government repression. At first glance, this is surprising since government repression has far-reaching social, political and human consequences.

But a closer look reveals some impediments that have contributed to this lack of consideration. Historically, it can be attributed to serious imperfections in the means available for monitoring government repression world-wide. The problem was (and still is) further compounded by government efforts to disguise and conceal the true state of affairs. These obstacles have been at least partially overcome by recent collections of comparative data (e.g., Gastil, 1978-82; Taylor and Jodice, 1983a, b) that have improved both the quality and quantity of data regarding, among other things, the extent of civil and political liberties, government sanctions, and political executions.

Public policy is another factor that can and has influenced the extent of focus on political repression. Since it often sets the tone for any coordinated effort to address social problems, its declining commitment to the problem of repression is unfortunate. In spite of efforts by organizations such as Amnesty International, which attempt to monitor violations of human rights around the world, the issue in recent years has been overshadowed by "more pressing" global problems. One contributing factor has been the declining commitment of the United States to the improvement of human rights and the elimination of repression. Klare and Arnson argue that the Reagan Administration has reversed the efforts of President Carter by acting "to downgrade the importance placed on human rights in official government policy" (1981:2). This shift is rather unfortunate for it serves to undermine many efforts directed at improving the sorrowfully deteriorated state of human rights.

These are some of the factors that have dampened the interest in government repression. Concomitantly, the acuteness of the problem has taken on new dimensions and is now an integral part of international relations. For example, according to some observers (e.g., Klare and Arnson, 1981), the Reagan Administration with the cooperation of its allies are engaged, with missionary zeal, in "supplying repression" to a number of right-wing authoritarian regimes through what is known as the

"international repression trade." This is an area of
commerce in which authoritarian regimes actively trade with
various western powers to acquire the technology and know-
how to suppress opposition.

Furthermore, present circumstances in El Salvador, Chile
and South Africa give us reason enough to pursue, for both
intellectual and practical reasons, contributions in this
area. Conditions of this magnitude undoubtedly pose a
challenge for understanding the socio-economic conditions
upon which such actions are founded and presents us with the
question of the extent to which government repression is
more endemic to certain nations.

Hopefully, the above discussion is sufficient to indicate
the importance of repression as both an intellectual and
moral problem, and thus one deserving of attention. Any
effort to address this problem must begin with a discussion
of the meaning of repression. The following section focuses
on this issue. Then I state the purpose of this thesis which
in general will be to examine and test three competing
theoretical perspectives on government repression. I will
then present a statement of the theoretical significance of
the proposed research and conclude the chapter with a
summary of the chapter and an overview of the remaining
chapters.

Political Repression Defined

Like many issues of concern to social scientists, government repression has been defined in various ways. McCarmant (1986:22), for example, defines political repression as:

> those coercive activities carried out by
> rulers against opposition, real or imagined,
> for the purpose of weakening its ability to
> oppose or take control.

Although McCarmant (1984) does not elaborate, this interpretation includes two essential elements: 1) the use of coercion; and (2) the purpose of coercion. Together these two features explain government repression as actions with specific intentions. This definition denotes acts of forcefully curbing or restraining dissent in order to maintain the status quo. It is a fairly accurate interpretation of repression. However, it is limited in its scope and some elaboration may therefore be appropriate.

First, one may argue that the threat of coercion is also repressive in nature and thus should be included in any definition, since it may serve to inhibit any potential opposition. Second, the above definition limits the idea of repression to coercive activities against a "real or imagined" opposition. Implicit in this, but perhaps in need of additional emphasis, is the notion that a perceived threat (by an opposition) against the authorities can be

crucial in coercive activities. As Duff and McCamant (1976:25) point out, repression is really a reflection of the insecurity felt by the government:

> it is an indication that the government feels threatened. It is an admission by the government that the population would like to express its dissatisfaction with the government or the social situation...and would express such discontent if it were allowed to do so.

For comparison we can look to the definition provided by Bissel et al. (1978, cited in Stohl and Lopez, 1984:7):

> the use of coercion or the threat of coercion against opponents or potential opponents in order to prevent or weaken their capability to oppose the authorities and their policies.

This definition is more complete than the former. A synthesis of the two, however, may provide a more adequate definition of repression. Thus, I will define government repression as the threat or use of coercion against opponents – perceived or potential – in order to inhibit their ability to express opposition to authorities and/or their policies.

Statement of Purpose

Recent focus on the human rights situation around the world has coincided with a rekindling of interest and scholarly research on political repression (e.g., Wolfe, 1973; Duff and McCamant, 1976; Timberlake and Williams, 1984) and democracy (e.g., Winham, 1970; Jackman, 1974;

Bollen, 1983; Bollen and Jackman, 1985). To a large extent
existing comparative research has centered on tests of three
alternative theoretical perspectives on political
repression: the conflict approach (e.g., Jacobs and Britt,
1979; Williams and Timberlake, 1984); the modernization
approach (e.g., Timberlake and Williams, 1984); and the
dependency/world systems approach (e.g., Timberlake and
Williams, 1984). However, cross-national research in this
area is limited. In particular, researchers have not
simultaneously tested all three perspectives.

This thesis represents an attempt to fill this gap by
evaluating the empirical validity of the three alternative
theoretical perspectives on government repression. The first
step will be to review the three theoretical perspectives
and examine the existing empirical research for each
theoretical perspective. Then, specific hypotheses derived
from the three alternative perspectives will be tested
simultaneously.

Summary and Overview

In this chapter I addressed the problem of government
repression. I also considered the definition of repression
and concluded by outlining the purpose and significance of
the thesis. Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the three
theoretical arguments and includes an overview of empirical
research on each orientation. Chapter 3 consists of a

discussion of the data and method used in the study. Chapter 4 contains the findings of the study. Finally, a discussion of the significance and implications of the findings is presented in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The practice of emphasizing one approach and
deemphasizing or ignoring the relevance of another is a
common practice. Attempts at formulating explanations of
government repression are also prone to this practice. Most
cross-national studies of government repression have
centered on tests of one of three contending "iconic"
models; namely, the conflict, modernization, and
dependency/world-system approaches.

This thesis departs from the conventional practice and
will instead simultaneously test three hypothesis derived
from the three competing theoretical perspectives. This
chapter outlines the divergence, but more importantly, the
relevance of each of the perspectives in explaining
government repression. The chapter is divided into three
main sections — each section contains an outline of the
theoretical perspective and a discussion of the relevant
empirical research.

The Conflict Approach

Proponents of the conflict orientation propose that a high level of internal economic inequality is a primary determinant of government repression. The contention is that economic inequality both reflects and perpetuates elite control of political power and this leads to government repression. This hypothesis has its foundations in the Marxian conception of the structure of society. In this regard, it may be appropriate to first examine the main elements of Marx's contributions to an understanding of the nature of society. This is followed by a discussion of the role of the state which will be centered around the debate between conflict theorists in the structuralist and the instrumentalist theoretical camps. Finally, this section concludes with a review of the extant empirical research.

Marx and Class Conflict. For Marx, society can be understood as consisting of two key elements: the substructure and the superstructure. The substructure (composed of the forces of production and the relations of production) is the foundation determining the character of the basic institutions of society (i.e., the superstructure). In the following passage, Marx and Engels (1968:182 [1859]) summarize their position on the nature of

the relationship between the substructure and

superstructure:

> In the social production of their life, men enter
> into definite relations that are indispensable and
> independent of their will, relations of production
> which correspond to a definite stage of development
> of their material productive forces. The sum total
> of these relations of production constitute the
> economic structure of society, the real foundation,
> on which rises a legal and political superstructure
> and to which correspond definite forms of social
> consciousness. The mode of production of material
> life conditions the social, political and intellectual
> life process in general.

The mode of production is a system of production in which

individuals interact with each other and nature for their

material existence. Each mode of production is the product

of the relationship between the forces and relations of

production. The forces of production include the instruments

and technology used in the production process. Within the

relations of production, on the other hand, there exists a

class of owners of the means of production and a class of

non-owners (as well as various subsidiary classes such as

the petit-bourgeoisie and the lumpen proletariat, in

capitalism, which are aligned with one or the other of these

two major classes). It is the relationship between the two

classes in the capitalist mode of production which is of

primary concern here.

Proponents of this perspective argue that there is open

or incipient hostility between the two classes owing to the

exploitation and domination of the non-owners by the owning

class. It is important to note that ". . . domination, in

Marxist thought, is not an inherent part of the human condition, just as conflict is not an inherent feature of human nature. Domination and conflict are inherent (only) in class societies . . ." (Miliband, 1977:18). The basis of this "inherent" domination of one class by another is the process of capital accumulation where the dominant class has to necessarily (and continuously) extract surplus value. The acceleration of capital accumulation and exploitation of the laboring class are the forces that give rise to the polarization of wealth between the two primary classes and that intensify the antagonism and hostility between them.

Although Marxists would argue that class domination is economically determined, it nevertheless transcends the economic sphere and emerges as the underlying feature of the superstructure — having "many different and related facets" (Miliband, 1977:20). In this tradition, the state emerges as an institution which reflects the existing relations between the classes. Unlike other theories of the state, Marxist theory does not see this institution as representative of "society as a whole." This, according to Miliband (1977:66), follows from the Marxian conception of society as "class society." The state is not detached from the prevalent class conflict but is a fundamental part of it: "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx and Engels, 1948:11). This famous and often quoted statement represents the foundation for much of the debate

among political sociologists regarding the political economy of the state; and the extent of this controversy is no less intense within the Marxian school of thought than it is among those outside it (e.g., Miliband, 1977; Poulantzas, 1978). Within Marxism the controversy has taken the form of a debate between the instrumentalists and structuralists.

The Instrumentalists. Marxists of the instrumentalist persuasion (e.g., Sweezy, 1942; Domhoff, 1967; Miliband, 1977) generally regard the state as an instrument of the bourgeoisie. This interpretation of the state is closely aligned with the sentiments of Marx and Engels expressed in _The Communist Manifesto_ (1948). According to Paul Sweezy, for example, the state is "an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure. . ." (1942:243). Domhoff's (1967, 1971) work is representative of the major contemporary contributions to the instrumentalist view. He provides an elaborate description of the professional and personal interrelationships and links between top government and corporate elites. This strong reciprocal relationship is further intensified by the exchange of strategic roles in government and the economy. Consequently, those of the instrumentalist persuasion claim that "corporate leaders act in concert with political and other institutional leaders to protect capitalist interests and to assure preservation of the prevailing class system" (Marger, 1981:104).

The Structuralists. The structuralist alternative puts more emphasis on the structure of society than on the links between the elites (Marger, 1981:104). Nicos Poulantzas (1969) is one prominent Marxist of the structuralist persuasion who argues that the contradictions of the (capitalist) economic system make it necessary for the state to represent the interests of the capitalist class:

> (T)he direct participation of members of the capitalist class in the state apparatus and in the government, . . . is not the important side of the matter. The relation between the bourgeois class and the state is an objective relation. This means that if the function of the state in a determinate social formation and the interests of the dominant class in this formation coincide, it is by reason of the system itself: the direct participation of members of the ruling class in the state apparatus is not the cause but the effect, and moreover a chance and contingent one, of this objective coincidence (Poulantzas, 1969, cited in Gold et al., 1975:36).

Poulantzas views the state as relatively autonomous "from manipulation by specific capitalist-class members or interests" (Gold et al., 1975:38). Instead, he maintains that the state performs the function of "mediating" the contradictions of the capital accumulation process which are potentially destructive to the economic system.

Economic Inequality and Repression. Despite the differences between these two views, the underlying theme of both views is that the state is a function of the logic of the mode of

production; it is "the product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms" (Lenin, 1974:8). As class polarization (characterized by economic inequality) increases, it intensifies class conflict and threatens the security and stability of the state and economic structure. This increases the likelehood that the state will engage in repressive activities.

This interpretation of the state provides us with a testable hypothesis: Economic inequality has a positive effect on repressive activities.

Previous Empirical Research. A number of researchers have examined the relationship between inequality and the use of force as a means of social control. Jacobs and Britt (1979), for example, tested this relationship in the context of state governments in the United States; that is, the unit of analysis in their study was the American state. They operationalized state coercion (the dependent variable) as the use of deadly force by the police. This indicator was measured by the number of killings committed by the police between 1961 and 1970 as a proportion of the mean population for the same period. The Gini index of income inequality for 1960 was employed as a measure of income inequality. After controlling for eight other variables (i.e., police per capita, percent change in population, percent black, percent of state residents residing in large cities, violent crime

rates, border status, southern status, and percent poor),
they found a significant and positive relationship between
income inequality and police use of deadly force.

Until recently, cross-national research examining the
relationship between inequality and the use of repression
has been limited. Williams and Timberlake's (1984)
"Structured Inequality, Conflict, and Control: A Cross-
National Test of the Threat Hypothesis" has been a welcome
contribution to the literature. Drawing from the conflict
argument, they test the hypothesis that income inequality
has a positive impact on the use of negative sanctions by
national governments. Government santions (1973-77) was used
as an aggregate measure of government repression. Income
inequality was estimated by the concentration of income in
the top ten percent of total households in a country. With a
sample of seventy nations, they found that inequality did
not have a significant effect on government sanctions. They
also included political exclusion as an independent variable
in order "to explore the nature of the relationship" between
the two (1984:420). The results indicate that politically
exclusive regimes tend to be more repressive. In addition,
they also found that income inequality had a significant
positive effect on political exclusion. Given this, they
suggest the posibility of an indirect relationship between
income inequality and government sanctioning.

One important point of concern however. Williams and

Timberlake (1984) treated political exclusion as
analytically distinct from repression. They used the
Gastil (1982) "political rights index" as an indicator of
the extent of political exclusion in a nation. This index
reflects "the formalized ability of people to play a part in
determining who and what laws or policies will govern one's
country" (1984:423). Nations are ranked on a seven-point
scale where a rating of (1) indicates that a state is least
exclusive; having an open and competitive electoral process.
A rating of (2) is given to states that are relatively free
but experience extreme economic inequality or use
intimidating violence. Ratings of (3) to (5) reflect states
with "less effective implementation of democratic processes"
(1982:9). A rating of (6) is given to states without a
competitive electoral process and (7) for states where top
political leaders "appear by their actions to feel little
constraint from public opinion or popular tradition"
(1982:15).

As mentioned, they predicted and presented empirical
support for a positive relationship between exclusion and
repression. A more appropriate interpretation of this index
might be that it is simply another manifestation of
government repression. Support for this claim can be
established from their conclusion that: "Elitist governments
are structurally repressive in the sense that they deny the
masses access to political participation" (1984:425). In
sum, while Williams and Timberlake (1984) included political

exclusion as an independent variable in their analysis, the
nature of the "political rights index" suggests that it is
more appropriate and theoretically sound to view exclusion
as another aspect of government repression. In fact, in a
later study by Muller (1985) on the relationship between
income inequality, repression and political violence, the
"political rights index" was employed as a measure of
government repression.

These two indicators then (i.e., sanctions and exclusion)
can be viewed as empirical manifestations of a similar
concept: government repression. Consequently, by including
political exclusion as an independent variable, the effect
of income inequality on government sanctions may have been
suppressed. In light of this, it is only fitting that this
relationship be reevaluated. In this thesis I reexamine the
relationship between income inequality and government
sanctions — omitting the variable political exclusion.

The Modernization Approach

A major factor contributing to the increased concern with
development and social change has been the emergence of new
independent nations and the problems associated with their
independence. The literature in this area is immense and
was instrumental in leading much of the research in the
social sciences during the 1950s and 1960s. Modernization
theorists were basically concerned with societal evolution

and the transition of nations from traditional to modern
societies (e.g., Levy, 1967; Moore, 1963).

By employing and modifying the typologies of classical
evolutionary theorists, modernization theorists identified
the dominant factors essential to "modernization." One main
focus of modernization theorists has been the concern with
political development. Contributions in this area — both
normative and empirical — are substantial and reflective of
an area of inquiry that is broad and diverse (cf. Chadok,
1973:229-251). Interestingly enough, amidst this diversity
there remains a strong association between economic and
political development. Another common feature of this social
mobilization approach, as it is often called, is its
emphasis on endogenous structural factors that are perceived
as functionally constituting and influencing particular
social structures.

The idea of government repression is very much related to
the development issue. As Duff and McCamant (1976) state,
modernization theorists hold that government repression is
inversely related to economic development. This view can be
attributed to the works of, among others, Lerner (1958) and
Lipset (1959). Implicit in these works on economic
development and political democracy is an argument about the
causes of government repression. The discussion here will
center on examining the relationship between economic
development, political democracy and government repression.

Economic Development and Government Repression. While
there have been numerous definitions of "modernization," it
is often equated and associated with industrialization and
technology. Levy (1967:190) defines modernization in terms
of technological advancement and considers a society more
modernized:

> the greater the ratio of inanimate to animate power
> sources and the greater the extent to which human
> efforts are multiplied by the use of tools.

A somewhat broader but related definition of
modernization is:

> (the) total transformation of a traditional or
> pre-modern society into the types of technology
> and associated social organization that
> characterize the advanced, economically prosperous,
> and relatively politically stable nations of the
> Western World...In fact, we may...speak of the
> process as industrialization. Industrialization
> means the extensive use of inanimate sources of
> power for economic production, and all that entails
> by way of organization, transportation, communication,
> and so on (Moore, 1963:89, 91-92 as cited in
> Appelbaum, 1970:38).

Note that there is a strong tendency to relate
modernization with socio-economic (and industrial)
development. Those who adhere to the modernization position
regard these socio-economic changes as essential to the
development of political democracy. Lerner (1958), for
example, presents a sequential and causal interpretation of
this process. He claims that the "secular evolution of a
participant society appears to involve a regular sequence

of...phases" (1958:60). Urbanization is seen as the "take-off" stage of this process — necessitating the transformation of traditional constructs and establishing the basis for the modern production process. This development encompasses increased literacy. As a nation's literacy rate increases, the mass media become prominent and further stimulate higher literacy and education. These socio-structural changes are essentially prerequisites and reproductive forces of economic development.

Just as modernization continues to promote education and literacy, it leads to increased public awareness and participation in the political process. This transition creates a more diffuse and democratic political structure. As Lerner explains, "(d)emocratic goverance...typically appears as a crowning institution of the participant society" (1958:64). Thus, economic development, or more generally, modernization necessarily spearheads processes of political change and initiates the emergence of a democratic political system. As such, economically developed nations are perceived to have greater civil and political liberties. This orientation, then, can be logically expanded to include the notion of government repression. Since the institutionalization of democratic processes involves the notion of a participant society (which includes the ability of people to express opposition and dissent), the lack of such freedom clearly reflects the exclusive and repressive nature of a regime. Therefore, as economic development

leads to democratization, the incidence of government
repression also becomes less frequent and consistent. I
will test the hypothesis that economic development has a
negative effect on government repression.

Previous Empirical Research. The relationship between the
emergence of modern institutions and democracy has been
empirically analyzed by, among others, Lerner (1958), Lipset
(1959), McCrone and Cnudde (1967), Smith (1969), Winham
(1970), Bollen (1983) and Bollen and Jackman (1985). While
diverse measures of political democracy have been used by
previous cross-national researchers, there is general
support for a positive relationship between socioeconomic
development and political democracy.

Bollen (1983), for example, finds strong support for a
positive relationship between economic development and
political democracy for a sample of one hundred countries.
Political democracy was measured with an index consisting of
six indicators: (1) fairness of elections; (2) whether chief
executives are elected or not; (3) the means of selecting
legislators and the effectiveness of the process; (4)
freedom of the press; (5) freedom of opposition groups; and
(6) use of government sanctions (1983:471; see Bollen [1980]
for a description of this index). Economic development was
measured as energy consumption per capita (see Bollen,
1983:471-472).

However, the relationship between economic development and government repression has not been fully explored. Timberlake and Williams' (1984) research provides little support for this assertion. The results of their analysis indicate that economic development has a negative effect on repression, but the effect is weak.

The Dependency/World Systems Approach

The influence of modernization theory has recently been eclipsed by the critique and revisions presented by proponents of the dependency approach regarding the nature of relations between modern and non-modern nations (e.g., Dos Santos, 1976 [1968]; Frank, 1969). The inability of most Third World nations and especially Latin America to overcome severe structural problems despite the diffusion of modernizing agents stimulated the early literature on dependency. Andre Gunder Frank (1968, 1969) and Dos Santos (1970) were among the first to propose a new direction in the study of development. Contrary to the modernization argument, Frank argued that increased contact and interaction through the influx of capital and technology from the developed nations is detrimental to less developed nations. It leads to the perpetuation of an inadequate infrastructure primarily because the relationship (based on unequal exchange) is one of exploitation by the developed nations. This then subjects the economies of less developed

nations to their more affluent and dynamic counterparts.

Structure of the World Economy and the State. Since these early works, proponents of dependency theory have expanded on and established some parallel with the world system paradigm. Adherents of world system theory propose that there exists a capitalist world economy composed of three structural categories (core, semi-periphery and periphery) which are linked through an international division of labor dominated by the core (Wallerstein, 1979). Like dependency theorists, world system theorists argue that non-core nations are exposed to exploitation by the core through exchange relations thus recreating the structural barriers that maintain the international division of labor and the world system (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, 1977). The dependency/world system position suggests that dependence tends to distort the development process of noncore nations (Frank, 1969; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985). Although not all dependency theorists agree on the nature of uneven development, the basic view is that noncore nations do not follow the path of development proposed by modernization theorists. Tests of the dependency/world system theory by Chase-Dunn (1975), Rubinson (1976), and Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985) suggest that dependence distorts economic development.

The underlying argument is that the extraction of surplus from non-core countries is facilitated by the converging

interests of core and non-core elites. This naturally
contributes to continued peripheralization of non-core
nations. In this process, the non-core elites are seen as
systematically employing the local state structure — even to
the extent of limiting political freedom — to maintain their
advantageous position (cf. Bollen, 1983:470). In this
regard, the state apparatus functions (through repression)
to preserve the collective interests of elites in the
periphery. Political democracy, as such, is not as common
in non-core nations as it is in core nations (Chirot, 1977;
Bollen, 1983).

An additional aspect of this argument is the claim of
some theorists (e.g., Chirot, 1977:80) that semi-peripheral
nations have political systems that are much stronger and
repressive in relation to peripheral nations. As semi-
peripheral countries "aspire to the core", the economic
demands on them become more exorbitant (Bollen, 1983:470;
see also Chirot, 1977:77). This leads to a tendency for
governments in the semi-periphery to play a more direct role
in the economic process — making them strong and less
tolerant of dissent:

    The state (in the semi-periphery) will have to
    repress. . .in order to keep consumption down
    and investment high. Since the state's short-term
    economic goal is to maximize investment while
    keeping cost down, the demands of a growing
    working class will. . .be repressed (Chirot,
    1977:80-81).

From this, we can deduce the following: since non-core

nations remain dependent, experience uneven development and are characterized by elite domination, dissent by the masses posses a threat to the existing structural conditions. And this lack of tolerence for dissent may be greater in the semi-periphery. As such, semi-peripheral countries and to a lesser extent peripheral countries should be more repressive than core countries.

Previous Empirical Research. Results of previous cross-national research suggest the possibility of a positive relationship between dependence and political repression (Timberlake and Williams, 1984). However, this link is not only weak but it is also one aspect of dependency theory that has not been sufficiently explored. Timberlake and Williams' (1984) cross-national study suggests that dependence has no direct effect on government repression. Using cross-sectional data for seventy-two countries in circa 1975, they find that politically exclusive regimes (measured by Gastil's [1982] "political rights index") are more apt to resort to repression.

In examining the results presented by Timberlake and Williams (1984), I find that when political exclusion was regressed on dependence, the coefficient for dependence turns out to be significant. Based on the positive relationship between dependence and exclusion and also between exclusion and repression, they suggest a possible

indirect relationship between dependence and government repression. However, I have sugested reasons why it may be theoretically more reasonable to treat exclusion as another aspect of repression. Thus, it is likely that by treating political exclusion as an independent variable separate from repression, the impact of dependence on government repression may have been suppressed.

Given this probable situation, the relationship between dependence and repression will be reexamined by excluding political exclusion from the analysis. This will also enable us to assess more confidently the significance of this perspective relative to the others.

Other related cross-national studies include Bollen's (1983) analysis of world-system position and dependency on democracy, and Bollen and Jackman's (1985) analysis of the relationship between world-system position and political democracy. Both of these studies used Bollen's (1980) political democracy index (that is, the six indicators listed above) and Snyder and Kick's (1979) classification of world-system position. The results reported in both studies support the argument that non-core nations have less democratic regimes. In addition, Bollen (1983:476) also finds that ecomonic dependence (measured by penetration of foreign capital) has no significant effect on political democracy.

Summary

The focus of this chapter has been on a discussion of the three major perspectives on government repression and the previous research. As the overview illustrates, each approach essentially emphasizes one main determinant of government repression.

The conflict argument, as summarized above, views repression as determined by economic inequality. In contrast, modernization theorists essentially argue that economic development is a key to greater political stability, freedom and less government repression. The third argument advanced by dependence/world system theorists suggests that due to the dynamics of the world economic system, countries in the semi-periphery (and to a lesser extent, countries in the periphery) are more likely to be repressive. In the following chapter, I discuss the data and method used to empirically evaluate the hypotheses derived from the three theoretical traditions.

CHAPTER 3

DATA AND METHOD

Although other cross-national researchers have attempted
to test hypotheses derived from one of the three
perspectives discussed in Chapter 2, no effort has been made
to empirically test simultaneously the empirical validity of
all three arguments. In addition, as the review in the
previous chapter shows, the results of previous cross-
national research have been inconclusive.

Another drawback of earlier studies (i.e., Timberlake and
Williams, 1984; Williams and Timberlake, 1984) is the
inappropriate use of political exclusion in the analysis of
government sanctioning. This may possibly explain why
previous studies find no significant relationship between
income inequality and repression (Williams and Timberlake,
1984) or between dependence and repression (Timberlake and
Williams, 1984).

This thesis attempts to correct these shortcomings by:
1) examining simultaneously all three explanations of
repression; and
2) omitting political exclusion from the analysis.

Findings from this study should provide more insight into the importance of certain structural factors that affect repression. Further, it may also possibly suggest why previous studies were unable to establish any significant relationships between income inequality or dependence and government repression.

In this chapter I describe the data and method. After a few words about the sample, I turn to the variables employed in this research and the operational measures or indicators of these variables. Following this, I describe the method of analysis employed and conclude the chapter with a summary.

Sample

The unit of analysis in this study is the nation-state. Sixty nations for which requisite data were available are included in the analyses (see Appendix I). There are obvious limitations associated with this sample. The most obvious problem is that this is a non-probability sample. However, due to the the lack of universality in the reporting of data for heterogenous units such as nations, this situation is unavoidable. The drawback of this sampling technique is the biasing effects that it can have on the results. This threat is minimized since the sample is well represented by nations in the core (n=13), semi-periphery (n=19) and periphery (n=28).

Dependent Variable

Government repression is measured as the number of
government sanctions imposed "to neutralize, suppress, or
eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the
government, the regime, or the state itself" (Taylor and
Jodice, 1983b:62). Specifically, this indicator consists of
(a) censorship of individual or institutional political
publications (i.e., government actions to restrict or
intimidate the mass media by actions ranging from censoring
news and reports to shutting down news agencies); (b)
general restrictions on political activitity (i.e.,
declaring martial law, mobilizing troops for domestic
security and instituting curfews); and (c) restrictions on
the social and political behavior of individuals, parties or
political organizations (i.e., the persecution of
individuals for political beliefs and activities, harassing
or banning political parties, arresting opposition leaders
for security reasons, deporting individuals who express
opposition and arresting or deporting individuals involved
in protest activities, strikes, riots and armed attacks)
(1983b:62-63).

These indicators clearly represent actions that attempt
to inhibit the ability of individuals or groups to express
opposition. In this regard, this measure of repression

corresponds to the definition developed in Chapter I. It is also one that is widely employed in existing cross-national research (e.g., Timberlake and Williams, 1984; Williams and Timberlake, 1984; Weede, 1986; Muller, 1985, 1986). Data for this variable were taken from The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983b:64-67). To ensure consistency in the number of sanctions imposed, the total number of sanctions between 1963-1967 (logged to base 10 in order to correct for skewness) was used.

Independent Variables

Economic Development. The level of economic development, which is the key independent variable in modernization theory, is measured as energy consumption (in kilogrammes of coal) per capita for circa 1965. I use this measure primarily because it is widely accepted as a reliable measure of economic development (e.g., Taylor and Hudson, 1972:291; Jackman, 1974:35; Bollen, 1983:472). Data for this variable were taken from the United Nations' (1966:344-347) Statistical Yearbook.

World System Position. The measure of world system position used here is one developed by Snyder and Kick (1979:1104-1116). This measure reflects a nation's world system position for circa 1965. This classification of core, periphery and semi-periphery is based on a block-model

analysis of four networks of international interaction
(i.e., the extent of trade flow, military intervention,
treaty memberships, and diplomatic ties) reflecting the
economic and political dimensions and influence of nations
in the world—system. Unlike noncore nations, countries in
the core are seen as dominant powers in the world economy
and influential in international affairs (Snyder and Kick,
1979:1106).

This measure is used because it has been widely accepted
in the literature (e.g., Bollen, 1983; Nolan, 1983; Frey and
Dietz, 1984; Bollen and Jackman, 1985). Apparently, Snyder
and Kick (1979) misclassified several nations in their
analysis (see Bollen, 1983:473-476). Based on his
reevaluation Bollen suggests that instead of being in the
core, Spain, Portugal and South Africa should be classified
as semi-peripheral nations. In addition, Taiwan, Iraq and
Saudi Arabia were also reclassified as peripheral nations.
Since Spain, South Africa and Iraq are included in this
analysis, I recoded them accordingly. Two dummy variables
were created for the semi-periphery and periphery — with the
core treated as the omitted (reference) category. This was
done in order to estimate the deviation of the two dummy
variables from the core.

Economic Inequality. The measure of economic inequality
used here is the distribution of income within a nation. The
data for income distribution refer to the portion of a

nation's total income received by the upper 10 percent of households. As Williams and Timberlake (1984:422) state, the size distribution (or concentration) of income is viewed as more appropriate than the Gini index of income inequality since the theoretical implications of the inequality argument are focused on the concentration of wealth rather than its distribution across the population. A measure of the concentration of wealth rather than income would be more desirable since it is a more reliable measure of economic inequality. Cross-national data for this variable are not available. Income inequality data are for circa 1965 and were obtained from The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice, 1983a:134-136)

Control Variables

It is important that relevant controls be included in a research design in order to reduce threats to the validity of the estimates. Control variables help minimize the effect of extraneous factors that may undermine any causal inferences of the research. In addition, it also provides for more accurate estimates of the relationships explored.

Political Conflict. Since it is reasonable to assume that political conflict can pose a threat to a particular regime and therefore also lead to increased sanctions, a control for political conflict was included. The number of protest demonstrations for the period 1963-67 ([+1]logged base 10 to correct for skewness) was employed as a measure of political

conflict. This measure is based on the following definition
of political conflict: "a nonviolent gathering of people
organized for the announced purpose of protesting against a
regime or government or one or more of its leaders; or
against its ideology, policy, intended policy, or lack of
policy; or against its previous action or intended action"
(Taylor and Jodice, 1983b:19). Data for protest
demonstrations were taken from The World Handbook of
Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice,
1983b:22-25).

Eastern Bloc Status. Another concern in this research
centers on a possible confounding effect that the inclusion
of eastern bloc countries may have on the estimates. Their
unique status as highly centralized and "closed" social
systems raises some uncertainties about their effects.
Although there are only six eastern bloc countries in the
sample, it is still reasonable to suspect the impact of
these countries. Therefore, as a precaution, a dummy
variable for eastern bloc status was included as a control
variable in the analysis.

Method of Analysis

I used ordinary least-squares regression to estimate the
effects of the independent variables on government
repression by regressing the dependent variable (government
sanctions) on the independent and control variables. The
equation below summarizes tne predicted effects of the

variables on government repression:

(1) $Y = a + b1X1 - b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + e$

where Y = total sanctions (1963-67, logged base 10)

    a = constant

    b = unstandardized regression coefficient

    X1 = income inequality (circa 1965)

    X2 = energy consumption per capita (1965, logged base 10)

    X3 = peripheral status (dummy variable, circa 1965)

    X4 = semi-peripheral status (dummy variable, circa 1965)

    X5 = political conflict (number of protest demonstrations 1963-67, logged base 10)

    X6 = eastern bloc status (dummy variable, 1965)

    e = residual term

Several diagnostics were used to assess the stability of the estimates. One specific concern is the problem of multicollinearity. When serious problems of collinearity exist, the regression estimates will be unreliable (Kim and Kohout, 1975:340; see also Rockwell, 1975). Using Haitovsky's heuristic test (Rockwell, 1975) the equations were checked for multicollinearity. Outliers are another common concern in cross-national research since they deviate from the predicted pattern and often bias the estimates. The plot of standardized residuals (which is a technique that

allows for the identification of outliers) was used to check for this problem.

Summary

This chapter contained a discussion of the sample and data and method. I presented a summary of the various indicators and operational measures used in the analysis. The last section contained a description of the method of analysis and various diagnostics that were carried out to assess the stability of estimates.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

This chapter presents the results of the analysis. The
chapter is divided into two main sections. First, the
bivariate results are presented and the issue of
multicollinearity is examined. Results of several different
regression analyses are reported in the second section.

Bivariate Results

The bivariate (zero-order correlations) results are
presented in Table 1. Government sanctions (SANCTG67) and
protest demonstrations (PROTES67) ($r = 0.512$) have a strong
relationship. This association is also in the predicted
direction. The other variables that are related to sanctions
in the predicted direction include income inequality
(INEQ1965) ($r = 0.131$), eastern bloc (EASTBLOC) ($r = 0.100$),
and semi-peripheral status (SEMIPHER) ($r = 0.280$). However,
these coefficients are relatively small, ranging from 0.100
to 0.280. Note that the relationship between government
sanctions (SANCTG67) and energy consumption is

Table 1

Zero-Order Correlations among the Variables and

Means and Standard Deviations (N=60)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.SANCTG67	1.00	.512	.056	.131	-.196	.280	.100
2.PROTES67		1.000	.310	-.084	-.286	.029	-.220
3.ENERGY65			1.000	-.544	-.482	.241	.322
4.INEQ1965				1.000	.433	-.054	-.512
5.PERIPHER					1.000	-.636	-.089
6.SEMIPHER						1.000	.131
7.EASTBLOC							1.000
Mean	3.39	1.81	6.54	34.7	0.46	0.31	1.00
S.D.	1.26	1.54	1.57	10.1	0.50	0.46	0.30

SANCTG67 = Sanctions, 1963-67 (log 10)

PROTES67 = Protest Demonstrations, 1963-67 ([+1]log 10)

ENERGY65 = Energy Consumption, 1965 (log 10)

INEQ1965 = Income Inequality, circa 1965

PERIPHER = Periphery, circa 1965

SEMIPHER = Semi-periphery, circa 1965

EASTBLOC = Eastern Bloc Nations, 1965

(ENERGY65) contrary to expectations (r = 0.056). This is also the case with the periphery (PERIPHER) (r = -0.196).

Multicollinearity or the existence of highly interrelated independent variables can seriously degrade the estimates. There is a fairly strong negative correlation between the periphery (PERIPHER) and semi-periphery (SEMIPHER) (r = -0.636). In addition, the matrix also indicates a relatively strong correlation between energy consumption (ENERGY65) and income inequality (INEQ1965) (r = -0.544). While these correlations are relatively strong, the general rule of thumb is that one need not be concerned with the problem of multicollinearity unless the correlation coefficients range from 0.8 to 1.0 (Kim and Kohout, 1975:340). However, Rockwell (1975:312) suggests that relying on this procedure is risky. Although there are a number of different tests to check for multicollinearity, Rockwell (1975:313) suggests that where dummy variables are involved (as in this analysis), the Haitovsky heuristic test should be used. Therefore to ensure reliability of the estimates a check for multicollinearity was undertaken for the full sample. The results of this test (Chi-square = 6.619; d.f. = 15) indicate that severe multicollinearity is not a problem.

Regression Results

Unlike the bivariate analysis, regression enables us to estimate the unique effect of each explanatory variable on

the dependent variable. Thus, it provides a more accurate
summary of the relationship by controlling for the effects
of other variables.

The first column of Table 2 lists the unstandardized
regression coefficients and standard errors for the full
sample of 60 countries. Among the variables of theoretical
importance, only income inequality (INEQ1965) is
statistically significant (b = 0.513). Although the
coefficients for semi-periphery (SEMIPHER) (b = 0.418) and
energy consumption (ENERGY65) (b = -0.104) are in the
predicted direction, they are not significant. Also note
that the coefficients for eastern bloc nations (EASTBLOC) (b
= 1.949) and protest demonstration (PROTES67) (b = 0.534)
are positive and significant. Given these results, one may
be inclined to conclude that economic development and world
system position do not influence government repression.
Instead, only income inequality turns out to be an important
predictor of government repression.

These estimates, however, were influenced by several
outliers. In the plot of standardized residuals, El
Salvador, New Zealand, the Philippines, Uganda, and
Madagascar turned out to be extreme outliers deviating from
the general predicted pattern. Checks were made to ensure
that there were no coding errors that may have caused these
outliers. The other possible explanations for this situation
would be either data for these countries are unreliable or

Table 2

Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) Estimates of Government
Sanctions 1963-67a

	Eq.1 SANCTG67 (N=60)	Eq.2 SANCTG67 (N=55)	Eq.3 SANDEN67 (N=60)	Eq.4 SANDEN67 (N=56)
PROTES67	0.534* (0.090)	0.556* (0.075)		
PRODEN67			0.812* (0.095)	0.732* (0.078)
EASTBLOC	1.949* (0.550)	1.779* (0.466)	0.460* (0.287)	0.563* (0.198)
INEQ1965	0.513* (0.017)	0.048* (0.015)	0.019* (0.009)	0.024* (0.006)
SEMIPHER	0.418 (0.414)	0.624 (0.349)	0.111 (0.218)	0.092 (0.152)
ENERGY65	-0.104 (0.112)	-0.088 (0.098)	-0.056 (0.059)	-0.034 (0.045)
PERIPHER	-0.274 (0.462)	-0.036 (0.405)	0.020 (0.241)	-0.050 (0.165)
Constant	1.125	1.023	0.232	-0.951
R^2	0.494	0.604	0.608	0.687
Adjusted R^2	0.437	0.555	0.564	0.648

a Unstandardized Coefficients with standard errors in
  parentheses
* Unstandardized Coefficient at least twice its standard
  error

SANCTG67 = Sanctions, 1963-67 (log 10)
PROTES67 = Protest Demonstrations, 1963-67 ((+1)log 10)
ENERGY65 = Energy Consumption, 1965 (log 10)
INEQ1965 = Income Inequality, circa 1965
PERIPHER = Periphery, circa 1965
SEMIPHER = Semi-periphery, circa 1965
EASTBLOC = Eastern Bloc Nations, 1965
SANDEN67 = SANCTG67/Population Density, 1965 (log 10)
PRODEN67 = PROTES67/Population Density, 1965 (log 10)

that these cases just do not fit the general pattern
consistent with the rest of the cases.

The five outliers were deleted from the sample and the
equation was reestimated. The correlation matrix was again
checked for problems of multicollinearity. Haitovsky's test
assured no severe multicollinearity (Chi-square = 5.627;
d.f.= 15). The estimates for the sample excluding the
outliers are reported in Table 2 (equation 2). The R^2 for
the equation increases from 0.494 in equation 1 (with the
full sample) to 0.604 in equation 2. But more importantly,
we see that the same variables remain statistically
significant. The major change, however, is in the
coefficient for semi-periphery status (SEMIPHER). The
unstandardized coefficient increases from 0.418 to 0.624 and
is now almost twice the standard error. Note that the
coefficients for energy consumption (ENERGY65) and
peripheral status (PERIPHER) are not significant in either
equation. In fact, the sign for peripheral status (PERIPHER)
is in the opposite direction than was expected. In sum,
these findings provide strong support for the conflict
argument that income inequality is a key determinant of
government repression.

Researchers involved in studies of political repression
have debated the rationale for controlling for the effect of
population size by standardizing events such as government

sanctions and protest demonstrations. Muller (1986) prefers
to standardize events like these while Weede argues that "it
makes little sense to standardize sanctions" (1986:439).
Since there is no consensus on this matter, I reestimated
the model once more in order to explore the effects of this
procedure. Government sanctions (log 10) and Protest
demonstrations ((1+1)log 10) were standardized by 1965
population density (logged base 10 to correct for skewness).
Data for population density were taken from the United
Nations' (1966:78-86) Statistical Yearbook. By this
procedure we not only control for population size but
territory as well.

Results for this analysis with the full sample size are
reported in column 3 of Table 2. No severe multicollinearity
was detected (Chi-square = 6.40; d.f.= 15). Note that the R^2
increases from 0.494 in equation 1 to 0.608 in equation 3.
In addition, all the explanatory variables are in the
predicted direction. However, like the estimates in equation
1 and 2, only protest demonstrations (PRODEN67) (b = 0.812),
Eastern Bloc status (EASTbLOC) (b = 0.460), and income
inequality (INEQ1965) (b = 0.019) are significant.

The plot of standardized residuals was checked for
outliers. Canada, Chad, Venezuala and Puerto Rico turned
out to be extreme cases. To examine the effects of these
outliers on the estimates, the equation was reestimated
without the outliers. Since the sample size was smaller, I

checked for multicollinearity again and no serious problem
was detected (Chi-square = 5.89; d.f. = 15). The regression
coefficients are reported in equation 4 of Table 2. As the
results indicate, the estimates remain fairly stable. With
the exception of peripheral status, all the variables are in
the predicted direction. Among the three key explanatory
variables of concern, only income inequality has a
significant effect on government sanctions.

Discussion of Findings

The most striking result of the analyses above are the
estimates for income inequality (INEQ1965). The regression
coefficients for this variable are fairly robust across all
four equations. In relation to existing cross-national
research, this contradicts Williams and Timberlake's (1984)
analysis of income inequality and government repression.

Of course there are a number of factors that may explain
this difference. Differences in time period, sample,
measurement error, and the like. However, I suspect that
there is something to be said about one point that has been
stressed throughout: the inappropriate use of political
exclusion in the analysis by Williams and Timberlake (1984).
While it would be worth investigating this by reestimating
their model, the income inequality data for the time period
of their analysis (i.e., circa 1975) are not available. In
fact, due to unavailable data, they used the same inequality
data for circa 1965 that was used in this analysis. This is

another reason to suspect their findings and possibly explains the discrepency between the results of Williams and Timberlake's (1984) analysis of inequality and repression and those reported here.

The findings also suggest that although in the predicted direction, economic development is not strongly related to repression. Interestingly enough, one other cross-national study (i.e., Timberlake and Williams, 1984) that has explored this relationship also found that economic development had a negative but relatively weak effect on government repression. This contradicts other research (e.g., Bollen, 1983; Bollen and Jackman, 1985) that supports the hypothesis of a relationship between economic development and political democracy.

World system position also has a relatively weak effect on government repression. Like economic development, there is some indication of support for the predicted effect of semi-peripheral status. In fact, the results for world system position are consistent with the argument. That is, the estimates for semi-peripheral status are greater than the estimates for peripheral status. However, the coefficients are weak, indicating that the relationship is not significant.

Recall that Timberlake and Williams (1984) found no significant relationship between dependence and government sanctions. However, the results in this analysis suggest

some support for the world-system argument. This is
consistent with the findings of Bollen (1983) and Bollen and
Jackman (1985) who present support for a negative
relationship between non-core status and political
democracy.

It may be appropriate here, to emphasize a point made by
Bollen and Jackman (1985:444) that empirical support for the
world-system position/dependency effect on political
democracy/repression has been mixed. Specifically, various
cross-national studies have found that dependency (measured
by penetration of foreign capital) has no significant effect
on political democracy (Bollen, 1983:476) or repression
(Timberlake and Williams, 1984). On the other hand, there is
consistent support for the world-system effect on political
democracy (Bollen, 1983; Bollen and Jackman, 1985).

Summary

The findings reported in this chapter basically support
the hypotheses derived from the three theoretical arguments.
With the exception of peripheral status, all estimates are
consistently in the predicted direction. However, income
inequality is the only key independent variable that appears
to have a strong effect on government repression.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have attempted to assess the validitiy
of three different views of government repression. The aim
was to contribute to the rather fragmented research existing
in the area. Another intention of this thesis was to correct
for several shortcomings that characterize the limited
extant research on government repression. Due to limitations
in the data, this endeavor has been confined to analyzing
government repression for circa 1965. It has, in effect,
only scratched the surface of this topic. In spite of this,
it has helped remedy the concerns raised regarding previous
studies and hopefully contributed to an area of inquiry that
has received relatively scarce attention.

The discussion in this chapter will focus on some of the
implications of the findings reported. In order to put this
into perspective, it may be appropriate to consider some of
the implications of this thesis in relation to the objective
specified in Chapter 1. The first section will focus on
this. Next, is a discussion of some possible policy
implications that may be drawn from this contribution.
Finally, I conclude the chapter with suggestions regarding

the possible direction of future research in this area.

Theoretical Implications

As outlined in Chapter 1, this research was primarily
concerned with assessing the validity of three varying
perspectives on repression. In this regard, the results
provide strongest support for the conflict argument.
Government sanctioning appears to be one tool of repression
that is categorically applied in highly unequal conditions.
The implication is that highly polarized economic conditions
can indeed create an athmosphere of instability and
insecurity within the state apparatus (which is persumably
guided by the interests of the elite). And as the logic of
the conflict argument suggests, this insecurity on the part
of the state is manifested in the extent of repressive
activities undertaken.

At the same time, there is no indication that
economically developed countries are far less prone to use
repressive means than less developed nations. This
essentially contradicts the conventional wisdom of
modernization theory. In other words, while researchers have
shown that economic development may well promote political
democracy and "openess", it would be misleading to
generalize that government repression under these
circumstances would also therefore be minimal. Regarding
the impact of world system position, we see that although

there is support that nations in the semi-periphery are more repressive, this relationship is weak. This is also the case with the periphery.

There is also a broader and perhaps more important theoretical implication that can be drawn from this study. This centers on the importance of structural factors in explaining government repression. Like other studies, there is strong support that structural factors are crucial determinants of government repression and additional research should emphasize these factors.

Some students of government repression (e.g., McCamant, 1984) argue that theoretical perspectives like those examined here cannot provide adequate explanations of government repression. McCamant (1984) claims that any model of government repression must focus on the central role of the state. He views the perspectives examined here as focusing "too much on society. The focus must be on what is truly political, not social..." (1984:34). But we must also recognize that what he prefers to consider "truly political" does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, as this study has shown, its manifestation is influenced by and dependent on certain socio-economic factors as well. While the intention here was in no way to develop a model of government repression, it seems clear that any attempt to do so cannot ignore the important implications of these perspectives. Not doing so would severely undermine any

comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon.

Policy Implications

Along with the theoretical concerns, it is imperative
that we recognize the significance of the structural factors
examined here and their relationship to repression, because
they provide us with possible solutions to the problem.
Currently, most efforts aimed at addressing this problem
focus on exposing such activities and then exerting public
pressure to eliminate them. Amnesty International (1984)
suggests preventive and remedial measures to counter
activities such as torture and other inhuman treatment.
These measures range from official ratification and
declarations condeming such activities to developing a
systematic judicial system to combat such acts. Such
efforts are certainly invaluable. They also raise the
awareness of the general public and even inspire scholarly
research in the area. However, the success of such efforts
in curbing repression have been limited.

As this research indicates, structural factors have an
impact on the extent of repression. And since initiatives
such as those prescribed by Amnesty International (1984) do
not emphasize structural factors, it is no suprise why such
measures tend to be ineffective. To comprehend and counter
this phenomenon requires that we recognize the social
atmospnere in which repression exists. Consequently,

constructive measures directed towards curbing repression
must incorporate structural factors.

Suggestions for Future Research

Finally, a few words about future empirical research in
the area. At this point, research on government repression
is dictated and still severely hindered by the availability
of data. As more imformation and data become available,
future research must reevaluate the validity of the three
perspectives.

With regard to government sanctioning, future research
must also be sensitive to the indirect and/or interaction
effects of key explanatory variables. For example, in spite
of the fact that this research did not support assertions of
the modernization and world system perspectives, it is
possible that economic development and world system position
may have indirect effects on repression. Futhermore, since
it is obvious from the results that the key independent
variables examined in this research are interrelated, future
research can certainly contribute by exploring the
significance of their interaction effects.

APPENDIX I

Sample of Nations and Data

	Sanct.	Protest	Ineq.	Energy	Density
Core					
Australia	007	013	23.7	4795	02
Canada	023	016	25.1	7653	02
France	065	031	30.4	2951	90
Italy	032	027	30.9	1787	172
Japan	011	013	27.2	1783	267
U. Kingdom	059	046	23.5	5151	491
Denmark	003	001	25.5	4172	111
Norway	007	012	22.2	3588	012
U. S.	476	786	26.6	9201	021
W. Germany	080	086	30.3	4234	232
Netherlands	012	004	27.7	3271	371
Sweden	007	001	21.3	4506	017
Yugoslavia✿	032	000	22.5	1192	077
Semi-periphery					
E. Germany✿	132	001	16.9	5460	148
Argentina	116	030	35.2	1341	008
Egypt	075	005	31.1	0290	030
Hungary✿	042	000	19.1	2812	109
India	189	106	35.2	0172	163
Kenya	084	001	54.9	0124	017
Lebenon	039	002	45.1	0747	237
Pakistan	069	046	26.8	0090	111
Philippines	039	021	37.1	0209	112
S. Africa	235	017	40.9	2716	015
Spain	138	046	26.7	1023	063
Turkey	036	014	40.7	0348	154
Malaysia	094	020	39.6	1204	077
Finland	004	000	32.9	2679	014
Peru	026	001	42.9	0588	009
Mexico	016	005	36.7	0977	022
Sri Lanka	025	000	28.2	0114	175
Bulgaria✿	010	001	18.8	2571	074
Venezuala	100	001	35.7	2974	010
Periphery					
Czechoslavakia✿	037	001	17.4	5676	111
Indonesia	286	037	40.7	0111	072
Poland✿	083	014	21.2	3504	101
Brazil	137	005	50.6	0347	010
Iraq	085	007	49.8	0581	015

	Sanct.	Protest	Ineq.	Energy	Density
Zimbabwe	206	040	56.9	0651	011
Colombia	033	021	44.4	0532	016
Chile	027	012	34.8	1089	012
Thailand	028	000	42.6	0110	061
Tunisia	018	003	37.3	0200	027
Panama	021	018	32.2	1115	017
Equador	033	012	56.6	0212	019
Uganda	058	000	30.7	0042	033
Tanzania	067	002	41.6	0103	022
Uruguay	016	003	30.4	0916	015
Hondorus	010	000	50.0	0396	021
Costa Rica	002	000	39.5	0306	029
Zambia	044	000	44.0	0487	005
Puerto Rico	005	005	33.6	2125	300
El Salvador	001	000	33.0	0168	142
Jamaica	008	000	43.8	0887	168
Senegal	022	002	47.8	0145	018
Sierra Leone	027	000	37.8	0068	033
Benin	019	011	39.3	0040	021
Ivory Coast	016	000	41.5	0152	012
Chad	008	000	30.7	0015	003
New Zealand	001	012	25.4	2530	010
Madagascar	002	000	48.6	0042	012
Mean	59.2	25.9	34.7	1721.2	78.8
Standard Dev.	81.5	101.8	10.1	2042.8	99.0
Range	475.0	786.0	40.0	9186.0	489.0

* Eastern bloc nations
Sanct.   = Total Sanctions 1963-67
Protest = Total Protest Demonstrations 1963-67
Ineq.   = Income Inequality circa 1965
Energy = Per Capita Energy Consumption 1965
Density = Population per square kilometre of area 1965

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B.A., St. Cloud State University, 1985

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

College of Arts and Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Manhattan, Kansas

1987

ABSTRACT

   Considerable cross-national research has focused on the
nature and structure of governments. Part of this research
has centered on identifying the structural determinants of
government repression. This latter body of research has been
guided by three distinct theoretical perspectives: 1) the
Marxian (conflict) perspective; (2) the modernization
perspective; and (3) the dependency/world system
perspective.

   Proponents of the Marxian conflict perspective emphasize
economic inequality as a major determinant of government
repression. Proponents of the modernization perspective
claim that economic development is crucial to increased
political freedom, implying that as a nation develops
government repression will decline. Dependency/world system
theorists, on the other hand, argue that position in the
world economic system is a key determinant of the political
structure of nations and that nations in dependent positions
tend to be more repressive.

   Existing tests of these perspectives are limited and
inconclusive. Further, cross-national researchers have
failed to assess the validity of all three explanations
simultaneously. I remedied this deficiency. Specifically, I
used ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression to assess the
effects of income inequality, economic development, world

system position and several control variables (number of
protest demonstrations and Eastern bloc status) on a measure
of government repression (government sanctions) for circa
1965. Results suggest strongest support for the Marxian
conflict perspective.